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How might we speak of action in the critical zone, the near-surface layer of 
the Earth where most living things reside?2  This region of the Earth’s 
extended body is a complex, dense world, filled and folded, crowded with 
entities and processes, movement and transformation, activity and signs, 
whose powers and conditions of existence are hard or impossible to 
disentangle.  The character of Gaia and the critical zone seems not just to 
distribute agency but to alter its very condition of possibility; we humans act 
within this raucous realm, and only precariously subdue its clamour into 
quiet lawfulness.  But, as creatures of the critical zone, we also speak within 
and from it – and this very fact can help us express the texture of action 
amongst humans and non-humans here.   
 
In order to find linguistic resources that will help us unpack the mystery of 
action we will have to dig down into some of the deeper layers of the living 
archive of our language.  This digging and rummaging must be ‘deep’ in a 
temporal sense, for there have been changes in our languages that have 
made it harder to speak about action in the critical zone; but it must also be 
deep in another sense, since we will have to reach down into the taken-for-
granted machinery of language.  It is arguably more in its grammar than in 
its lexicon that the fabric of language has frayed – and it is in grammar that 
the closest affinity with relations between entities in the critical zone will be 
found.  With our grammar, more than with our names, we can reach out 
beyond the animal, to plants, fungi, dust and sand, communicating about 
the arising of action in the critical zone by seeing how our grammar 
communicates with it.  But first, let us stay in the realm of the lexical, and 
explore the very naming of action itself.   
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Initiating and bearing 
 
What do we do, when we name something an agent?  The English words 
‘agent’, ‘act’, ‘action’ all derive from the Latin verb agere3 - but as Hannah 
Arendt points out in The Human Condition, in both ancient Greek and Latin 
there were in fact two words used to designate the verb ‘to act’.  In Greek 
there was archein (‘to begin’) and prattein (‘to achieve, to finish’), and in 
Latin there was agere (‘to set into motion’) but also gerere (‘to bear, or 
sustain’).4  Although the difference between the two words in these dyads is 
formally one not of syntax and grammar but of semantics (that is, they have 
come to refer to different things in the world), they are so fundamental to 
the way we think that their descendants shape the very grammar of 
language around them.   
 
In classical times, these two were seen as mutually dependent: a beginning 
perhaps made by a single entity, and the achievement in which many join by 
‘bearing’, ‘finishing’ or ‘carrying out’ the enterprise, bringing their own 
powers to the task.  For how can something truly be said to have begun, if 
the conditions for its fulfilment are not in place? But slowly, as Arendt says, 
a crucial division opened up in European thought about agency and action, a 
split surely as consequential as that between nature and culture that Bruno 
Latour describes as the modern constitution.5  Agere, and the Greek 
equivalent archein, came to mean ‘to lead’, giving us the Western 
masculinist political imaginary of a ruler who rules alone, an ‘unmoved 
mover’ who rules because he is alone, who rules through his own isolation 
and is isolated because he rules, and the processes captured by words such 
as gerere and prattein became seen as the mere following of orders, the 
effects of a cause.6  
 
Yet within the critical zone this isolation is always an illusion, as it was in the 
case of Prince Kutuzov in War and Peace.7  As Arendt puts it, ‘the actor 
always moves among and in relation to other acting beings … he is never 
merely a ‘doer’ but always and at the same time a sufferer’.8  Amongst the 
multiple agencies of the Earth, there is no simple division between initiator 
and bearer, between leader and follower – and as we shall see later, 
between active and passive.  In the critical zone we are in the domain of 
Michel Serres’ helmsman whose will ‘acts on the vessel, which acts on the 
obstacle, which acts on his will, in a series of circular interactions’;9 when we 




Fig. 1: Herbert James Draper, The Steering Oar, study for  
The Golden Fleece, 1904.  Chalk on paper, 36 × 43 cm. 
In steering a boat, an oarsman’s gestures are shaped  




But let us move our attention away from nouns and verbs, and focus more 
directly on the grammar that we use to talk about processes and activities.  
A good place to begin – if beginnings there can indeed be in the critical zone 
– is the grammatical ‘aspect’ known as the ‘imperfective’, which various 
languages use for ongoing, uncompleted, habitual or repeated actions.  In 
English we do not really have a proper imperfective; the closest is the past 
progressive or continuous: for example, we say “she is/was reading a book” 
for ongoing action, contrasting with the perfective “she read a book” for a 
completed action.   
 
Some activities we can describe in either the perfective or the imperfective, 
and the shift of perspective involved in that choice is interesting.  If we 
describe an action in the perfective – ‘you read this book’ - the action itself 
becomes, as it were, a closed book: we view it from the outside, and 
especially from the end looking back, and the inward structure of reading is 
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occluded.  But when using the imperfective – ‘you were reading this book’ – 
we seem to enter into the activity.  The process becomes something that 
has an inner structure and texture, and can even serve as a surrounding 
milieu in which other actions can take place – for example we might say 
‘while you were reading this book <imperfective>, a thought occurred to you 
<perfective>’.10  We can see how easily the imperfective takes on some of 
the complex, ‘nested’ feel of the critical zone. 
 
The very name ‘im-perfective’ should not go unremarked; its negatory prefix 
is revealing, in that it suggests that this aspect is somehow derivative of and 
subsidiary to the perfective. The Polish word for the ‘imperfective’ aspect is 
also negative: ‘niedokonany’ – ‘not finished’ or ‘not accomplished’.   But 
these names seem to work against a deeper truth. 
 
We can clarify this through the distinction between energeia and kinesis 
that Aristotle makes in his Metaphysics and De Anima.11 A kinesis is an 
activity with an end product, such as travelling to Berlin, baking a cake, or 
writing a book.  During the activity it is all potential, as the end has not been 
actualised. Completing the action – for example taking a cake out of the 
oven, and seeing that a potential cake has turned into an actual cake – 
manifests the actual but destroys the potential, and thus destroys the 
purpose of the activity, which comes to a natural finish.   
 
But an energeia is a kind of activity with a different temporality.  Examples 
would include things like parenting and friendship, which are not a merely a 
means to an end but themselves confer value on life: there is never an end-
point when they come to a natural finish and become pointless.  In English, 
the difference between the two is revealed by the lexical choices we make.  
You can ‘finish’ a kinesis, by ‘completing’ the activity and contemplating its 
result; but if an activity is an energeia it never comes to a finish in and by 
itself, so you can only ‘stop’, ‘end’, ‘halt’ or ‘terminate’ a period in which you 
are actively engaged in it.  
 
A kinesis can also be described in the imperfective, but the energeia has a 
special relationship with it.  And this can help us understand the ambiguity 
within the names ‘imperfective’ and ‘niedokonany’.  A kinesis – that is, an 
action that is a means to an end – is incomplete during the action itself, 
exactly because it is capable of being completed.  But an energeia, 
something we do as an end in itself, is arguably complete and 
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(accomplished) all the way through – and that is because it can never be 
fully completed or accomplished.12   
 
We need to overturn our dominant hierarchy, and see energeia as the 
paradigm form of activity rather than having something lacking when 
contrasted with the means-ends, achievement-oriented activity of kinesis.  
In kinesis, actualization and potentiality are incompatible – they cannot exist 
at the same time.  But, as was the case with any unqualified separation of 
initiating and carrying out, this is a temporary deviation from the steady 
state of energeia. In energeia, potentiality and actualization can – indeed 
must – coexist.13  So perhaps the name for this grammatical aspect should 
not be ‘unfinished’, ‘uncompleted’ or ‘imperfect’ but actually ‘unfinishable 
and thereby complete and perfect’.   
 
The human animal body – mobile, with a front-back asymmetry – seems 
almost to bias us towards kinesis.  The way that our powers of locomotion, 
manipulation and perception are distributed around our bodies incline us to 
imagine time like a spatial dimension, stretching out in front and behind 
us.14  We ‘go forward’, we are ‘held back’; or we imagine time ‘going past’, 
like another animal body – what we experience first we say is be-fore (i.e., is 
at the ‘front’ of time’s body), then is aft-er (at the ‘back’).15 We tend to think 
of events as objects that we encounter and leave be-hind.      
 
If we are fully grasp energeia as the dynamic coexistence of potential and 
actual, perhaps we should attend to plants.  The metabolism of animals 
allows them to have separate rhythms of eating, digesting and expending 
energy, so that they can hold the actual at bay while they engage in 
compound actions aimed at a distal goals.16  For plants, by contrast, 
nourishment, growth and activity are continuous and potentially infinite, 
never satisfied or pausing or giving space for other pursuits; and the plant in 
its endless repetition of leaf and leaf, and bud and bud, is so very different 
from the heroic human for whom repetition is tragic failure.17  The living 
plant is neither a state (in which there is pure actuality and no potentiality) 
nor an activity aiming at an achievement (in which pure potentiality 
eventually gives way to pure actuality).  The plant is pure energeia, with 
potential and actual always coexisting, and in its presentation is an 






Fig. 2: A plant, in which growth and form are  
continuous and potentially infinite, is pure energeia, 
and radically open to the temporalities of light and rain. 
Photo by Faris Mohammed on Unsplash. 
 
The middle voice 
 
Another kind of grammatical relation that can help us articulate the 
structure of becoming in the critical zone is that of linguistic ‘voice’, or 
‘diathesis’.  A voice is a particular set of relationships between the action 
that a verb describes and its associated nouns – the subject, object, and so 
on.  Modern English basically has two voices – the active voice, in which the 
subject is the active element – ‘I pick up the pen’ – or the passive voice, with 
a passive subject – ‘the pen is picked up (by me)’.  But note what the active 
and passive voices agree on: both of them divide the world starkly into 
active and passive elements, agents and patients, initiators and bearers. 
 
The middle voice, which occurs in ancient Greek, Sanskrit, Hebrew and some 
other languages, does not divide the world in this way – it emphasises that 
most of what happens in the world does not involve a heroic agent imposing 
their active will on a passive environment, but is a collaboration, an 
interaction, that entangles the entity in its milieu.  And in those languages 
whose voice main contrast is not active–passive but active–middle, even the 
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active voice is more interesting, not diametrically opposed to the middle but 
often ready to shape-shift into it.19 
 
In the middle voice, the subject is not an agent outside the process 
represented by the verb, but inside it, and affected by it.  Emile Benveniste 
tries to capture this with lexical choices: the subject is the ‘centre’ or the 
‘seat’ of the process; ‘he achieves something which is being achieved in 
him’.20  Homer often used the medial form when writing about the exploits 
of the heroes of his epic poems, as if they feel themselves ‘immersed in the 
action in such a way that, at least at times, “doer” and “done to” become 
inadequate categories, drawing a sharp line, legislating a boundary, where 
none is felt’.21 
 
In many languages, a middle-voice effect was also sometimes achieved by 
the use of ‘impersonal’ constructions – verbs without a subject – especially 
to describe processes or affects that seem to ‘befall’ someone.  Instead of 
saying ‘mi miseret’ (‘I feel compassion’) or ‘mi paenitet’ (‘I am sorry’), for 
example, a Latin speaker might say more by saying less: ‘miseret’, 
‘paenitet’.22 
 
But in the centuries since, as Indo-European cultures and languages evolved, 
we seem to have lost our voice.  As Gonda put it, with the slow decline of 
belief in ‘gods, demons and impersonal powers affecting men and other 
beings with fear, panic, love, longing’, humans started instead to describe 
these experiences as internal processes.23  Verbs in which middle voice or 
impersonal forms had dominated started shifting to the stark oppositions of 
active and passive, in which the subject became seen as exterior to and 
unchanged by the process. 
 
Yet the middle voice still seeps unbidden into our everyday ways of seeing 
and acting in the critical zone. ‘Seeping’ in the last sentence is a medial 
process – as would be a thought ‘occurring to you’ while reading this book. 
Think also of a conversation. ‘I am talking to you’ is active voice; but ‘you are 
listening to me’ is kind of middle voice: you are doing something, but in a 
way that opens you up to alterity, to the wider situation; in such activities 
we become more like plants, whose embeddedness in place confers a 
similar ‘hetero-temporality’, since their time is not their own but is oriented 
to the ‘other’ of light and rain and seasons.24 
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Recall our two action verbs, agere (‘to initiate’) and gerere (‘to bear’). Agere 
seems to require the active voice; but verbs based on gerere, such as ‘digest’ 
and ‘gestate’, are more middle in tone.  And the keywords that Lisa 
Baraitser  uses in her book on ‘enduring time’ – waiting, staying, delaying, 
enduring, persisting – as well as having that gerund form ending in ‘-ing’, 
that suggests the imperfective and energeia, are also weighted towards the 
middle voice, neither passive (having something done to you) nor active 
(doing something where you are in control).25  Yet the reason Baraitser had 
to write a book about them, and gather them together as ‘enduring time’, is 
surely that we have forgotten how fundamental the middle voice is to 
human experience – and I would say more-than-human experience. 
 
Across history, the most common uses of the middle voice seem to have 
been to describe emotions and moods, but also the weather – and this is 
surely no accident.   Our own giving voice from the midst of our emotions 
and moods naturally draws on weather words, because of the affinity 
between the two.26  Besides, in weather events, entities such as falling 
snowflakes or gusts of wind that might be said to form the ‘seat’ or ‘centre’ 
of the event cannot be separated from the event in which they participate, 
which seems to prompt us to use the middle voice. Some languages such as 
Finnish use atransitive ‘impersonalia’ rather like the Latin examples above to 
describe weather – with just a verb, ‘rains’; others like English use dummy 
subjects such as ‘it’ to half-conceal the fact no separate agent is doing the 
raining.  For others still, such as Malagasy, Udihe or Palestinian Arabic, it is 
the day or the village or the very world that is ‘raining’ or ‘shining’.27   
 
But some forms of motion can also call forth the song of the middle voice, 
especially the motion of drifting and floating things, such as air-borne plant 
seeds, spores or dust, sediment washed along a river, or rafts tugged by 
currents and waves.   Drift is the motion of solid bodies moving through 
moving fluids, such that the motion is the result of the play between the 
body and its surrounding medium.28  And to describe drifting and floating 
we naturally adopt the middle voice, for though a drifting seed is not forced 
to flow (passively) in lock-step with the surrounding fluid, neither is it 
(actively) in control of its actions.  Attending to how things drift in this way 
can help us make sense of forms of action and thought that do not power 
themselves heroically to an end, that are entangled in their conditions of 





Figs. 3 a-c: Phosphorus-rich dust from the Western Sahara  
drifts across to the Amazon in a process best described  
in the grammatical “middle voice.”  
Credit: NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center 
 
But just because drift is a phenomenon of the middle voice, of the play 
between body and environment, does not mean that drift cannot be put to 
work.  Both living and non-living entities and systems can engage in 
‘driftwork’, in which drift is subsumed within a wider set of purposes or 
functions.29  Drift built our world, pushing up mountains, concentrating 
minerals, laying down and building up sedimentary rocks and soils.  Things 
without limbs – plant seeds, fungi spores, Saharan dust – use drift to 
disseminate (note the middle voice).  And things like us that do have limbs, 
with the ability to propel and to steer our bodies, can withhold one or both 
of those powers. Birds can hold their wings almost still, and drift through 
rising air in thermal soaring or slope soaring. Shoppers in a market place can 
also put drift to work, allowing themselves to pulled this way and that, to 
increase their chances of coming across something new, or cheaper, or 
better, or more alluring.30   
 
And when we rest or fold our limbs – as when we are travelling on a train or 
bus, or sitting in conversation – we turn ourselves into a washload to be 
carried along by a stream, not exactly like the currents around us, but in the 
middle voice and imperfective aspect of absorption.  In creative thinking or 
discoursing we allow our mind to drift, to cross the streamlines of directed, 
purposive thought, so that we can find new possibilities through the middle 






In our quest to see how language might help reveal the ‘grammar’ of action 
in the densely folded critical zone around the Earth’s surface, we have 
touched on both semantics and syntax. The treasures we have found have 
led us on a stroll through the umwelten of animals and plants, seeds and 
dust, rain and snow. 
 
In asking how we might properly name action in the critical zone, we were 
led from acting and initiating, to bearing and carrying out, and the 
impossibility of ever finally separating the two.  Turning to grammar, while 
we were exploring the imperfective aspect we found ourselves considering 
energeia, processes in which potential and actual coexist in constant 
dynamic relation.  And in adopting the middle voice, in which the subject is 
neither the active controller nor the passive recipient of a process, but is at 
the centre of it and being transformed by it, we perhaps started to glimpse 
how we might ourselves undergo a transvaluation. 
 
For surely we need to appreciate the mode of being characteristic proper to 
energeia, the imperfective and the middle voice that we share with our 
fellow entities of the critical zone – and to see this mode of existence not as 
a sign of lack, privation or regression, but as more fundamental.  Such a 
revolution of thought would share features with the medieval method of 
textual interpretation known as anagoge, in which the mind and the spirit, 
through attending to empirical states of affairs in a particular way, are led 
upwards (agere, again) to spiritual truths.31  But if we are to come ‘down to 
earth’, to become terrestrial,32 what we need now is not anagoge but 
catagoge – not ascent but descent, leading and carrying us not up to 
abstract concepts but down into the very origins and machinery of language, 
and not up to a singular nature but down to the multiple, entangled beings 
and powers of the critical zone. 
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